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ABSTRACT 
We  present evidence  on  the cyclical  behavior  of  small versus 
large manufacturing  firms, and on the response of the two classes 
of firms to monetary policy.  Our goal is to take a step toward 
quantifying the role of credit  market imperfections  in  the 
business cycle and in the monetary transmission mechanism.  We 
find that,  following tight money, small firms sales decline at a 
faster pace than large firm sales for a period of more  than two 
years.  Further, bank lending to small firms contracts, while it 
actually rises for large firms.  Monetary policy indicators tied 
to the performance of banking, such as M2,  have relatively 
greater predictive power for small firms than for large. 
Finally, small firms are more sensitive than are large to lagged 
movements in GNP.  Considering that small firms overall are a 
non-trivial component of the economy, we  interpret these results 
as suggestive of the macroeconomic relevance of credit market 
imperfections. 
Mark Gertler  Simon Gilchrist 
Department of Economics  Research and Statistics 
New York University  Federal Reserve Board 
269 Mercer  Street  Washington,  DC  20551 
New  York,  NY  10003 
and NEER 1.  Introduction 
This paper presents evidence  on the cyclical behavior of small versus 
large manufacturing  firms,  and  on  the differential response  of the two  kinds 
of firms to various  indicators  of monetary policy.  Our  objective  is to 
provide some empirical insight  into the role of credit market  imperfections 
in the monetary  transmission  mechanism  and in the business  cycle,  more 
broadly.  Subject to the usual caveats of interpreting time series results, 
our principal  findings  are that small  firms react more  sharply  and typically 
quicker both to  movements  in GNP and to  movements  in conventional 
indicators  of monetary  policy.  As  we will argue,  our empirical  findings,  in 
conjunction  with the fact that small firms are a non-trivial component of 
GNP, are suggestive of the macroeconomic  relevance  of credit  market 
frictions. 
There is a  large body of  evidence  consistent  with the idea that 
monetary  policy has been an important factor in postwar  business 
fluctuations  (e.g.,  Sims  (1980),  Eckstein and  Sinai  (1986),  Romer and  Romer 
(1989),  Bernanke and  Blinder (1990)).  There remains,  however, considerable 
debate over the exact nature  of the monetary transmission  mechanism.  One 
element of this debate  is whether credit market imperfections  may enhance 
the potency of monetary policy (e.g., Blinder and Stiglitz (1983),  Romer and 
Rorner  (1990),  Bernanke and  Blinder (1990),  Kashyap, Wilcox  and Stein 
(1991)).  Efforts to resolve this issue have concentrated  on  analyzing the 
response  of various  money  and  credit  aggregates  to shifts  in  monetary 
policy.  Though this approach has  been  informative,  one  limitation is that 
the competing theories are often  capable of generating  similar  predictions 
about the movement of money  and  credit.  This observational  equivalence problem arises because it is typically difficult to distinguish  between 
demand versus  supply-induced movements  of each  financial aggregate.'  We try 
to shed light  on the issue in an alternative way,  by  comparing  the cyclical 
behavior of small  versus large firms.  Our  approach exploits the  idea that 
small  firms are more likely to confront  credit market frictions.2 
Section 2 presents a simple model  designed to illustrate how credit 
market  imperfections  may introduce a  kind  of risk aversion  on  the part of 
firms,  making their behavior 'excessively sensitive'  to  earnings  flows and 
to interest rates.3  The model  also  predicts  that these  magnification 
effects are likely to  be  proportionately  greater the smaller the firm.  The 
model  thus suggests,  everything else equal, that  small firms should  be  more 
sensitive  than  large firms to  macroeconomic  conditions.  Macroeconomic 
conditions  include both the state of the business cycle and the stance of 
monetary policy,  under the interpretation that changes in the short term 
interest rate encapsulate shifts  in monetary  policy.  It  is worth adding 
that our story is complementary but  not isomorphic to the "credit  view'  of 
'There  have  been some creative approaches to solving the  identification 
problem.  Kaahyap, Wilcox  and Stein  (1991), for  example,  try to identify 
shifts  in credit supply by examining the behavior of the division of  short 
term credit between  bank  loans and commercial paper,  and then  demonstrating 
the relationship  of this "mix"  variable to real  activity. 
2Differential  effects on small versus large firms has been  an important theme 
of the empirical  literature on credit  market imperfections  and investment. 
See,  for  example, Fazzari,  Hubbard  and Peterson  (1928) and Evans and Jovanovic 
(1989).  The  macroeconomic consequences are discussed in Gertler and Hubbard 
(1989). 
3This kind  of excess  sensitivity  result is  a key feature of the  literature 
on  the macroeconomic consequences of  credit  market  imperfections.  See,  for 
example,  Farmer  (1985),  Williamson  (1987), Greenwald and  Stiglitz (1988), 
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Gertler  (forthcoming). 
2 monetary policy,  as articulated by  Blinder and Stiglitz (1983)  and  Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988);  this  is because our theory relies on magnification 
effects owing to credit market  imperfections  rather than on  the ability  of 
monetary policy to directly regulate bank lending.4 
We  check the general  implications of our  model  by  analyzing the time 
series  behavior of small versus  large firms.  Section 3 describes the data 
set we use.  It consists  of a time series of sales  by manufacturing  firms, 
divided up by size class.  We present  some summary Statistics to indicate 
how  relative importance  and  cyclical behavior varies by  size class.  Section 
4  presents an analysis of this data within a set of time series models that 
include GNP and  one  or more indicators  of  monetary  policy.  The models allow 
for interactive effects between large and small  firms in order to help 
identify  the true independent impact of the macroeconomic variables. 
Perhaps  our main empirical result is that small  firms are  indeed more 
sensitive  to shifts in monetary  policy.  We  employ  two  different methods to 
capture exogenous shifts  in monetary  policy,  and find  that the result holds 
in both cases.  We first use innovations in the federal funds rate,  as 
5uggested by Bernanke and Blinder (1990);  and then  consider  the dummy 
variables  for shifts  to tight money  that Romer and  Romer  (1989)  constructed. 
The  differential response  of small firms is particularly striking when  the 
Romer  dummies  are used.  Relatedly, we find  that  in the wake of tight money, 
4Romer  and  Romer  (19901 have  criticized the  credit view,  arguing that 
because reserve  requirements  on  CDs  are low (now  they no longer exist), 
monetary policy cannot effectively  regulate  the flow  of bank lending.  (The 
argument presumes that  banks are able to elastically issue  CD5,  which is 
open  to debate.)  Whether our theory is right,  however, is not  tied  to the 
question of whether  open  market  operations  directly control  bank  credit. bank  lending to small firms contracts,  while it rises for large firms. 
Additionally, small firms are more sensitive to lagged movements in  GNP, 
which is Consistent with our theory. 
We  also  explore the partial correlations  of small and large firms with 
the various  monetary policy indicators.  Several results here deserve 
highlighting:  Small firms are more Closely related than large firms to  M2 
and to the ratio of bank loans to  commercial  paper (the  'mix'  variable 
constructed  by Kashyap, Stein  and  Wilcox  (1991) to capture the tightness  of 
monetary policy);  Conversely,  the commercial paper/ T-bill risk-spread is  a 
better predictor of large firm behavior.  Financial aggregates  connected 
with banking 
—  M2 and the mix variable  —  are thus relatively more 
informative  about small firm behavior, while the financial aggregate most 
directly connected with conditions in the commercial paper market  —  the risk 
spread 
—  is most informative about large firm  behavior.  We  show  further 
that the  current recession conforms to this pattern (and indeed exhibits 
symptoms of involving a credit crunch on  small  firms).  Concluding  remarks 
are  in section 5. 
2.  Theory 
In  this  section we present  a simple model  designed to  illustrate how 
credit market imperfections may amplify the impact of macroeconomic 
disturbances,  including shifts in interest rates,  technology  and  demand.  An 
important  prediction  is  that  the magnification effect  is  stronger in 
percentage  terms the smaller  the  firm.  The  basic  framework  is a variation of 
Townsend's  (1979) costly  state verification  model.  The  key  difference is the 
addition  of a variable  input  which  may  be thought of either as labor,  or perhaps  as an  intermediate input.6  This  modification allows us to study 
fluctuations  in firm output. 
There  are two  periods: 0 and l.'  A  risk-neutral firm has a technology 
which takes input x in period 0 and yields a  random quantity of output  y  in 
period  1.  It  Costs  (1/2)x2  to obtain  x units of input.  Output in period  1  is 
given by  y  2Ox.  The  random variable  w  is distributed continuously 
and  uniformly over the unit interval.  Therefore:  E(  x) =  Ox;  pr (  a w 
a H(w)  and 5H(d/& =  1.  The  realization of w  is  independent of 
events elsewhere  in the  economy;  that is,  w  is idiosyncratic  to the firm. 
The parameter 0 is a composite of a technology factor, i, which is common 
across firms  and a  scale parameter, A,  meant to reflect the size of the firm: 
0  = 
A  reflects the stock of fixed  factors; a larger value of A  raises the 
expected marginal  product  of the variable factor.  0  may thus vary across 
firms owing  to differences  in  A.  Time  series movements  in  0,  however, are 
due to the common  shock, and are therefore perfectly correlated across 
firms.  Think of the  common  productivity  shock  as a random variable  with a 
realized value , that becomes  known  prior  to the choice of x.  We  may 
therefore treat ' as parameter in the firm's optimization  problem, and may 
6For  applications  of Townsend's costly  state verification  model  to 
macroeconomics, see Gale  and  Hellwig  (1985), Williamson (l987b),  Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989),  and  Gilchrist (1990).  The  model  of  this paper  is most closely 
related to  Gilchrists. 
6For  an extension  of this kind  of  analysis to a dynamic environment,  where 
borrowers  and  lenders may enter rnultiperiod arrangements,  see  Gertler, 
forthcoming. 
5 interpret shifts  in  as a technology or demand  For 
parsimony,  we will suppress l' and  A,  and  instead  carry  around the composite 
parameter 8.  Shifts in  6  therefore encompass  technology  shocks, while the 
relative  level of 8  reflects firm  size. 
Because there exists  a lag in the production process,  the firm  must 
finance  its input  expenditure.  In  period  0,  it borrows  funds from  a 
risk—neutral competitive  intermediary.  The  size of the loan,  b,  is  given  by 
b  =  (1/2)x2  (1) 
The intermediary's opportunity cost  of  funds equals the gross riskless 
interest rate,  r, which we take as given.  As  with 8,  r may  be  random so  long 
as its value is known  before the firm's choice  of x. 
As  in Townsend (1979), we  assume  the intermediary  may  not  freely observe 
the firm's output.  To  do  so,  it must pay a fix cost  y.  One may interpret 
more generally  as the cost of default.  We  incorporate  scale economies 
in default  costs by assuming that y is fixed  even  though the firm's size of 
operation  is variable.8  We  assume  further that the ex  post bankruptcy  cost  is 
less  than  the size of the  loan  the firm  would  obtain  if there was  no  credit 
7That is,  UI  could either be  a productivity parameter  or  a relative price. 
Shifts in i are  technology disturbances  under the  former  interpretation and 
are demand shocks  under the latter. 
8The key  assumption  is that the expected average product is higher  for large 
firms than  for  small  firms (which  makes the debt  of the  large firm  safer). 
Having  any  kind  of fixed  cost  will  suffice.  To  minimize  algebra,  it is 
simplest to embed the scale  economies  in the bankruptcy  costs,  which in 
itself does not  seem unreasonable. 
Two  alternative ways to obtain our predictions  would  be to assume that 
small firms face proportionately  more idiosyncratic  risk  or to assume they 
have  proportionately  less collateral than  large firms.  Either assumption 
would  generate a proportionately  larger premium for  external  funds for  small 
firms. 
6 market imperfection.  This requires 
<  (l/2)(O/r)2  (2) 
where (e/r)  is  the first-best  value of x.  Equation  (2)  guarantees  that the 
credit market friction induces under—investment  relative to the first best.9 
As  Townsend (1979),  Gale and Hellwig  (1985)  and Williamson  (1987a) 
show, under certain assumptions, the optimal  financial contract is  risky 
debt.'0  Define d as the payment the firm promises to the intermediary. 
Whenever  realized output, 2ex, is  greater than  or equal  to d,  the 
intermediary  receives  this payment and the firm gets  to keep the residual, 
w2ex  - d.  If w2Ox  is  less than  d,  the firm defaults.  The  lender pays  and 
gets  to  keep  all the realized output.  The firm is  left with nothing. 
Since w is distributed uniformly over the unit  interval,  the probability 
of default,  p,  equals the ratio of the  promised payment  to the maximum 
feasible  value of output, d/28x.  Conditional  on  the choice of input  x,  p 
must satisfy 
20x'lp(I  - p)  + fu'du]  - p =  rb  (3) 
Equation (2)  requires that the  intermediary's  expected  return  (the left side) 
equal  its opportunity cost  of  funds,  rb. 
The firm's contracting/investment  problem  is to choose  x,  b  and  p to 
9Without condition  (2),  it may pay for the firm to over—invest relative to  the 
to  the  first—best  optimum  in order to exploit the  scale economies in 
bankruptcy  costs.  This  will  become  apparent  in  the  subsequent analysis. 
'°The two  required  assumptions are:  (i) only  deterministic auditing schemes  are 
feasible;  and,  (ii) the intermediary can  commit to an  auditing policy. 
Relaxing either of these assumptions  does  not affect our basic  conclusions 
regarding  the  impact  of the credit market  distortions on firm variability. 
However, we maintain  them  in order to  preserve tractability. 
-7 maximize expected  profits, V(x,p),  given  by 
V(x,p)  max( Ox  -  Ox[pll - p)  +  S'dsE,  0 )  (4) 
subject to equations  1  and 3,  and to the feasibility  condition that it can 
- 
never pay the intermediary  more  than  realized  output. 
There are two  kinds of outcomes.  We  call the first the "basic"  case,  and 
the second, the "rationing"  case.  In  both situations,  the credit market 
imperfection  enhances the sensitivity of output to shifts  in 8 or r.  Because 
the latter  only  emerges  when  the fixed  bankruptcy cost  is exceptionally large 
relative  to the size of the firm,  we concentrate most  of our attention on  the 
former.  The case of rationing is deferred to the appendix. 
2a.  Input  Choice  and  Output Fluctuations in the Basic Case. 
The firm chooses  input x to satisfy 
(5) 
where, 
8p  —  1  Er  -  (/blp1  (6)  —  2O 
2(1—  p)  - 
The left  side of equation  (5) is the  expected  marginal product of x,  and the 
•  ap.  right side  is the expected marginal cost.  The  term  is the rise  in 
expected bankruptcy costs.  >  0;  as x goes  up,  p  1= d/20x) must  rise to 
ensure that  the intermediary  receives a competitive return.'1  The  credit 
11(ap/8x)  is obtained by differentiating equation (3),  the constraint that the 
intermediary must  receive a competitive return.  The denominator, 
2(l—p) 
—  (/8x), is the change  in the  intermediary's  expected  return given a 
rise in the non—default  payment, divided by  Ox.  In  any optimum, this  value 
must  be  non-negative.  Otherwise the  firm could gain  by reducing  d,  and 
8 market  imperfection thus increases  marginal cost. 
Figure  1  illustrates the outcome.  The  dd  curve  portrays the expected 
marginal product of x,  which is fixed  at 6.  The  ss curve portrays the 
expected marginal  cost.  The  dotted  line plots  the function  rx, the marginal 
cost curve the firm would face in the absence of credit market  frictions.  The 
intersection  of the dd curve with the dotted  line accordingly  defines the 
first best  value of x  ——  call it x.  The  firm's optimal  choice of x,  however, 
is given by the intersection of the dd  and  ss curves.  The  expected  bankruptcy 
Costs (measured by the gap between ss  and  the dotted line) reduce  x below x 
It is now  apparent how  the impact of  the credit market  distortion  depends 
inversely on the size of the firm.  Inspection of  eqs. (5)  and  (6)  illustrate 
that the expected bankruptcy  costs  become  relatively  less  important  with 
increases in 6.  There is a direct  effect;  the  expected marginal  product  of x 
rises relative to the cx post bankruptcy cost,  There is  also  an  indirect 
effect.  The rise in the average product reduces  the marginal  probability  of 
bankruptcy.  (Notice in eq.  (6) that  varies  inversely  with 6,  ceterus 
parabus. I 
The credit market  imperfections  work  to magnify the impact  of shifts in 
any  of the primitive  parameters.  Figure  2 portrays the effect of a change  in 
still offer the intermediary  a competitive return.  In  the basic  case,  this 
value is positive  at the optimum.  The  basic case  arises,  therefore, if the 
bankruptcy cost is not  extremely large relative  to mean output,  and/or if the 
bankruptcy probability  is not unreasonably large. 
Condition (2) guarantees  that the  numerator  is positive  when x equals its 
unconstrained  optimal value  (0/rI.  This ensures  that the resulting 
constrained  optimum lies  below the first best.  See the analysis  below. 
'21t may be  verified  that  it is always profitable  cx ante for the firm to 
operate  in the basic  case;  i.e., expected profits are positive. 
9 8,  which we now interpret as either s shift  in technology or demand.  A  rise 
in  8  not  only  lifts the dd curve- The supply curve also rotates  outward,  as 
the expected marginal  bankruptcy costs decline.  The  key  idea  is that  input 
choice depends not  only  on  the net msrginal  product,  but  also on  the average 
product  which influences the expected average bankruptcy  coats.  A  rise  in 
the interest rate similarly  has a magnified effect, as Figure  3 
illustrates.'3  The  decline  in average product  raises  the marginal  bankruptcy 
costs,  which enhances the inward shift  of  the supply curve.  It may be 
verified formally  that  credit market imperfections  raise the elasticity of x 
with respect to both 8 and r.  Since expected output is proportionate to 
input,  the higher  input  elasticities translate into higher  output 
elasticities. 
Monetary policy  enters the picture to the extent it may be responsible 
for  shifts in the riskless interest rate r.  We  may  conclude,  therefore, that 
the credit market  imperfection  magnifies the ultimate impact  of monetary 
policy on firm  borrowing  decisions, and particularly  so for small  firma. 
Zb.  Additional  Considerations 
There are several other avenues through which credit market imperfections 
may produce "excess volatility' of  email firma.  Each involves a fairly 
straightforward extension  of the basic model.  First, appending  the framework 
to include variation in internal funds introduces  an  accelerator effect on 
'3See  Farmer  (l9g5), who also  emphasizes how incentive problems  in the credit 
market  magnify the impact  of interest rate ahifta  on output. 
10 input  demand, as  in Hernanke and Gertler (1989)14  This occurs because credit 
market  frictions introduce a wedge  between the cost  of internal and external 
finance.  In  terms of Figure 1, a rise in internal funds shifts the ss curve 
outward,  expanding input demand.  This effect is  stronger for  small  firms 
since,  ceterus parabus,  the required  premium for external finance is 
proportionately  higher for  these  kinds  of firms. 
Second,  risk  averse  behavior  by  intermediaries is  possible,  which would 
impact  largely on small firms.  If an intermediary  is unable to perfectly 
diversify, then its capital position may constrain  the quantity of  loans it 
supplies  [see Bernanke and Gertler, (1987)1.  This  is true  since  the 
intermediary's depositors  confront an incentive problem in lending to the 
intermediary  akin to the one the intermediary  faces  in lending to its 
borrower.'5  The bank's capital  position  matters ultimately  to its  lending 
decisions  because  it affects the price it must  pay depositors to attract 
funds.  Fluctuations  in bank capital  therefore affect loan terms.  The 
so-called "credit—crunch"  of the current recession  essentially works through 
this  mechanism.  The impact  is greater on small firms since they are unable to 
substitute to the open market  to obtain credit (since the monitoring  and 
evaluation  costs required  to obtain  "arms—length"  credit are 
disproportionately  large for  these  kinds  of firms. )16 
'4See Greenwald and  Stiglitz  (1988) and Calomiris  and Hubbard (1990)  for 
discussion  of of  a related mechanism. 
'5The inability  to perfectly diversify  idiosyncratic  risk is critical to the 
argument  why  bank capital influences bank  lending.  Diamond  (1984)  shows,  as a 
matter of theory,  that depositors  never face an  incentive problem with a 
perfectly diversified  intermediary.  This  is because any risk  to depositors in 
this case  is systemic,  and  is therefore observable. 
'6For  related reasons, it seems that the recent liquidity  effect models 
11 3.  Data Description 
Our  empirical analysis investigates  the cyclical sensitivity of small 
firms in comparison to large firms,  and examines the differences in the 
co—movements of small and large firms with various indicators  of monetary 
policy.  We therefore require a data set that contains time series 
observations  on  firms by  size class.  To  our  knowledge,  the only  source  for 
such data  with  any  significant  time series  dimension is the Quarterly 
FtrLanctal Report  for Manufacturing  Corporations  (QFRI.  Another advantage of 
the QFR is that it is comprehensive; this permits  us to assess the overall 
significance  of small firms in  an  important,  cyclically sensitive  sector. 
The  QFR  reports quarterly net sales  revenue for  all  manufacturing  firms 
as well as net sales revenue disaggregated by eight  different asset  size 
classes.  The  asset  size classes  include  all firms with total assets under  $5 
million, all firms with assets between $5  to $10  million, $10 to $25 million, 
$25 to $50 million, $50 to $100 million, $100 to $250 million, $250 to $1000 
million,  and  all  firms with total assets greater than  $1  billion.  The QER 
therefore provides eight different time series  of sales  data.  Each time 
series represents the total sales of  all firms within one  of  the eight size 
categories.  The  data are available from  l958:Q4 to  l990:Q3.17 
Although  we have  eight  potential  time series,  we reduce the data to 
which emphasize banks as a conduit  of  monetary policy (e.g.,  Fuerst  (1990) 
and  Eichenbaum  and Christiano  11991))  would  also  predict  a  small firm 
effect. 
'7Changes  in  QFR data construction  in  1974,1986,  and  1989  lead to 
slight breaks  in the level  series.  We  corrected  the level series by 
splicing the data,  using the overlap period provided by  QFR to create 
correction  factors. 
12 just  two series, one  for small  firms and  one  for large firms, by aggregating 
across  size categories.  We  aggregate for two reasons.  First, this  greatly 
simplifies  the empirical  analysis and reduces the VAR  systems  to manageable 
levels.  Second,  and  perhaps more  importantly,  by  aggregating across time 
series, we can  control  for the bias  that occurs  in the data  due  to the asset 
cutoff levels being in nominal terms,  as we will discuss  shortly. 
The  cutoff  level  for  small firms is $25 million dollars in assets.  We 
selected this  level  since  previous panel data studies  (e.g.,  Fazzari, 
Peterson,  and Hubbard (1988),  Gilchrist (1990))  suggest that firms that  are 
liquidity constrained  when  making their investment decisions  are 
concentrated  in the vicinity  of  this  size class  and below.  Table  1  reports 
the cumulative percentage of all manufacturing  sales  accounted  for  by firms 
with total assets less than the QFR  cutoff.  From column 3  of this  table, 
one  can see  that by choosing a cutoff level of $2.5 million,  we maintain a 
substantial  percentage of total manufacturing  sales  in our "small firms" 
category.  At the start of the sample,  small firms account  for  387.  of  total 
manufacturing  sales.  Because of the use  of  nominal categories, this  figure 
drops to  197.  by  1990,  still a substantial  percentage  of total  manufacturing. 
The  other columns in this table  highlight the effect of using  nominal 
categories  to classify firms,  since all categories  of  firms,  except  the 
largest, shrink  over  time as a  percentage of total manufacturing  sales.  For 
example, the smallest  category  of firms (assets  less  than  S5m)  accounted for 
267.  of total manufacturing  sales  in  1960,  but  only  127.  by  1990.  In 
contrast, the largest category  of  firms accounted for  157.  in 1960 and  567.  in 
1990. 
13 Table  1 
Percentage of Manufacturing Sales in  Cumulative  Asset  Size  Classes: 
Cumulative  Asset size class: 
Year  $5m  jQjy  jQ Q 
1960  0.26  0.31  0.38  0.44  0.52  0.65  0.85 
1970  0.21  0.24  0.29  0.34  0.39  0.49  0.70 
1980  0.13  0.16  0.21  0.24  0.28  0.34  0.47 
1990  0.12  0.15  0.19  0.22  0.26  0.32  0.44 
We  address the  "nominal  size category" problem in three ways.  First, 
we work with growth rates of real  sales  across  size categories,  rather than 
levels, irs order to mitigate  the impact of the trend effect  on  levels 
induced by inflation.'8  Second,  we aggregate  up to two  size categories  to 
control the direction of  bias that remains in the growth rate series.  This 
aggregation  induces a bias  that tends to understate the sensitivity  of small 
firms relative to large firms to the effects of monetary policy and other 
macro shocks.  For example,  suppose  there is a shift to expansionary 
monetary policy that  eventually raises inflation:  The  bias works towards 
increasing  the sensitivity  of large firms,  as  the rate of firms shifting 
into the higher  asset  category increases.  By inducing a bias  that dampens 
the relative  reaction of  small firms,  we are more confident  of the 
robustness  of findings  that imply  small firms may  be more sensitive  to 
either cyclical or monetary  shocks.  Finally,  in  our empirical  work,  we 
'8We also  remove seasonal  effects  in the sales  growth  rate  series  by 
regressing  the data on seasonal dummies  and  using the residuals. 
14 allow inflation to enter as an independent variable  in the equations  for 
firm behavior,  in order to capture  any remaining  effect  on  sales of 
category—shifting induced by  inf1ation.9 
We next report some descriptive  statistics.  We  present two  types: 
measures  of relative  volatility between the sales  of large and  small firms; 
and correlations between sales  of large and small  firms and  GNP.  We do not 
report average growth  rates for  the manufacturing  sales  data,  since these 
measures  are not  comparable due to the trends in each  series. 
To compare the volatility of sales growth  for  small  firms to the 
volatility of sales  growth  for  large firms,  we aggregate the sales  data into 
two  size categories  and compute standard  deviations f  or the growth  rate in 
each  category.  We  then  construct  a ratio  of  the standard deviation of the 
growth  rate of  small firms to the standard  deviation of the growth  rate of 
large  firms.  To account for the changing percentage  of total manufacturing  in 
any given size category,  we look  at different sub—periods  in  the data, 
computing 40  quarter standard deviations f  or each  sub—period.  To assess the 
sensitivity  of  this relative volatility  measure to changes in the cutoff used 
to classify firms into small and large categories, we vary the cutoff  level 
used  to  divide  the firms,  starting with  the lowest  QFR cutoff  and  steadily 
increasing  it.  These results are reported  in table 2. 
'1t is  also noteworthy that the QFR  keeps a firm in a  size class for eight 
quarters before  making  any  adjustment.  This dampens considerably  the number 
of firms which shift categories  in the wake  of  a macro  shock. 
15 Table  2 
Standard  deviations of sales growth rates of firms below a cutoff 
relative  to the standard deviation of firms above  the cutoff 
Cutoff level: 
Year  $5m  10rn  100m  ib 
1960-70  1.26  1.23  1.19  1.14  1.07  0.94  0.53 
1970-80  1.24  1.25  1.25  1.20  1.14  1.06  0.96 
1980-90  1.00  1.05  0.99  0.97  0.95  0.92  0.80 
From table  2 it is clear that the smaller size categories  exhibit as 
much if not more  volatility  than  the larger size categories.  For  all cutoff 
levels below $250 million, the standard  deviation of sales growth  for firms 
below the cutoff is much greater than  the standard deviation of sales  growth 
for firms above  the cutoff f  or the time periods 1960—69,  and 1970-79.  Even 
in the 1980's, when the volatility  of  small  firms appears  to  have  decreased 
relative  to large firms, this  ratio  is  at least  0.99  for  the bottom  three 
cutoff levels.20 
While  Table 2 concentrates on  raw  measures of sales  volatility,  Table 3 
presents information  about the cyclical volatility,  measured  by  the 
co—movement with  GNP.  Specifically,  it reports the  correlation between real 
20The volatility of sales growth appears to  be  bimodal across  size categories 
however, since  the largest size category  also exhibits  considerably more 
volatility than  other categories.  The  last  column  of table  1  shows that the 
standard deviation of sales  growth  for firms with total assets greater than 
$1  billion is considerably greater than  the standard deviation of sales 
growth  for firms with total assets less than  $1  billion.  The  variance  of 
the  largest category  tends to decrease  over  time,  relative to the rest of 
the sample,  as one  incorporates  more of  the  less  volatile intermediate size 
firms in this category. 
16 GNP  growth  and the growth rate in sales of  small  and large firms at  various 
leads and  lags.  Overa11  small firms are in the  same  league  of  cyclical 
volatility  as large firms.  Large firms  have  a  slightly stronger 
contemporaneous correlation, .55  versus  .44.  Small firms, though,  appear  to 
have  a slightly  stronger  lag  and  lead relationship with  GNP.  This  pattern 
is confirmed  by the Co—movement of the difference in the growth rates 
between small and large firms  with GNP,  reported  in the third row. 
Table 3 
Cross Correlations for Growth Rates of Small  and  Large Firm Sales  and  GNP 
Dlog(X)(t-s)  Dlog(Y)(t)  s=3  s=2  s=  Q  2 
Small  Firms  GNP  0.01  0.11  0.24  0.44  0.37  0.26  0.07 
Large Firms  GNP  -0.08 -0.06  0.16  0.55  0.26 0.0  0.16 
Small-Large  GNP  0.10  0.18  0.12  -0.06  0.15  021 -0.07 
Small  Firms  Large Firms  0.01  0.02  0.26  0.47  0.12  0.18  -0.15 
In summary,  the descriptive statistics  imply  that  small firms  account 
for a substantial  fraction of total manufacturing  sales;  and that they  are 
comparable to  large  firms  in terms  of overall  variation and in terms  of simple 
correlations with  GNP. 
4.  Empirical  Results 
We now examine  the  macroeconomic  performance  of  small  versus  large 
firms in the context of a  Set  of  VAR  models.  Each  model  includes both  small 
and  large firms,  GNP,  inflation and  one  or more indicators of monetary 
17 policy.  Inflation  is included in part to control for  the possible  bias 
owing  to nominal size classifications  (see the discussion in section  3).  We 
estimate each model  in two  different forms:  the first allows the growth 
rates of small  firms and  large firms to enter independently; the second 
restricts them to enter in difference  form (i.e., the relevant  firm variable 
is the difference  in the sales  growth rates of small and  large firms).  The 
former approach permits us to control in a flexible  way for interactive 
effects  between large and  small firms.  The  advantage of the second approach 
is fewer  parameters to estimate. 
We  use a number of different methods to assess  the relative behavior of 
small  and large firms.  First, we present  a set of exclusion restriction 
tests to determine the qualitative  importance of GNP and the monetary 
variables for  explaining the growth rates of small versus  large firms.  We 
further  assess the quantitative  magnitudes of these  partial correlations by 
examining the size of the coefficients  on  various lags  of the macroeconomic 
variables.  Finally,  we quantify the impact of an  innovation in either GNP 
or  in the stance  of monetary policy  on  the overall dynamic behavior of small 
versus  large firms,  using  impulse response functions.  We  follow two 
different approaches  in the literature to identify exogenous shocks to the 
stance of monetary  policy. 
Because  there is no universally accepted indicator  of monetary policy, 
we consider  a number of alternatives  popular in the  literature.  The  list 
includes:  M2,  the Federal Funds rate, the spread between the  six month 
commercial paper and  T-bill  rates, the short term  financing  mix  between 
bank loans and commercial paper,  and  the  dummy  variables  for shifts to tight 
money  that Romer  and  Romer  (1989) constructed.  M2  is picked because it is  a 
18 traditional and  widely—used measure of the stance  of monetary policy.  The 
limitation  of M2  (and  indeed of most of  these  indicators)  is that a large 
component of its variation is likely  endogenous.  Although endogeneity 
amongst the macro  variables  still  permits  us to analyze the impact  of 
shifting macroeconomic conditions on  small versus  large firm behavior,  it 
constrains  our ability  to disentangle the impact  of  monetary  versus real 
shocks. 
The  endogeneity problem leads us to two  other  indicators,  the funds rate 
and the Romer dates.  Bernanke and  Blinder  (1990) argue that it is 
reasonable  to treat a component of the contemporaneous innovation in the 
funds rate as exogenous  since the Federal Reserve sets  this  variable 
directly.  Romer  and Romer (1989) instead  rely  on  the minutes  of the Federal 
Reserve  Open Market Committee to identify dates when the Federal  Open Market 
Committee shifted  the course of monetary policy to fight inflation.  They 
argue that because these  episodes reflect primarily  responses  to trend 
inflation,  they may be  treated as exogenous with respect to the recent 
behavior of output. 
We  consider the two  other  indicators,  the spread  and mix variables, 
because they  may  reflect  credit  market  conditions not  captured by  the other 
measures.  Both  Romer and  Romer  (1989)  and  Bernanke (1990)  present  evidence 
suggesting  that the spread is driven by monetary policy and. 
correspondingly, that it may be  a  good  indicator of monetary tightness. 
Intuitively, tight money  leads to relatively  greater issuance  of  commercial 
paper and  CDs (which are close substitutes for  commercial paper),  which 
historically  placed upward pressure on  the commercial paper rate relative to 
the T-bill  rate.  The  attention the spread  has received  as a  leading 
19 indicator also makes it a desirable  candidate for study.  Similar 
considerations lead us to the mix variable.  Kashyap,  Stein,  and  Wilcox 
(1991) present  evidence suggesting that monetary policy  affects the mix, 
which reflects the relative  importance of'  bank  loans versus commercial paper 
in short term finance.2'  Tight  money  constrains  the ability  of banks to issue 
loans,  this increases borrower's reliance  on  commercial paper.  To the 
extent that bank loans and commercial paper are imperfect  substitutes,  the 
mix variable  may  be  viewed as an  indicator of credit tightness. 
We begin by  examining VAR  systems which include  the quantitative 
monetary variables:  M2 growth,  the Federal Funds rate,  the risk spread,  and 
the mix.  Later we consider  the  Romer  dummies.  For each  monetary variable 
we estimate  two VAR models.  The first includes  four lags  each of real sales 
growth of small firms, real sales  growth of large firma, real GNP  growth, 
inflation and of the particular monetary variable.22  The  second differs by 
replacing the two firm sales  growth variables  with a single  variable,  the 
difference  between the sales growth  of small and  large firms.23 
Table 4  reports the  exclusion test results f  or whether  or not  GNP 
21Short term  business bank  loans actually  appear to rise following tight 
money.  The  mix falls, therefore, because commercial paper rises faster. 
Evidence from the QFR,  which we report  in section  4,  shows that while bank 
lending to large firma  rises, bank lending to small firms actually  contracts 
following tight money.  Thus,  the behavior of  the mix  may be  at least partly 
explained  by  a compositional effect on  small versus large firms. 
22We  also tried different lag lengths,  none of which noticeably  affected our 
results. 
All equations are estimated  over the period  l960:Q2  to  1990:Q3,  except  for 
the regression that includes the mix variable.  Because  the commercial paper 
market  did not develop unitl  the mid—sixties,  regressions  using the mix are 
estimated  over  the  period  1965:01 to  1990:Q3. 
20 growth  and various  monetary variables provide additional  explanatory power 
for  the  sales growth rates of small and  large firms.  Figure  5  plots the 
individual coefficients  on lags  1  to 4  of  each macro variable, as well as 
the sum  of the coefficients  and  957.  confidence intervals, for the 
regressions  with small  and  large firms as  the dependent variables.  Figure  6 
does the same for the regressions  with the difference  between  small  and 
large firm growth  rates  as  the dependent variable.  These  figures also 
report the R2 and  the standard error of the regression  that resulted from 
these  regressions.  The exclusion tests  we report for  GNP growth are 
obtained from  the VAR system that includes the Federal Funds rate as the 
monetary variable.24  For the exclusion tests of other monetary  variables, 
besides the Funds rate,  we  use  the same  regressions,  replacing  the Funds 
rate with the monetary variable of interest. 
24We  focus on the  VAR  system with the Funds rate,  since it  is the monetary 
variable  likely  to  be  least endogenous  with respect to contemporaneous 
movements  in  GNP. 
21 Table 4 
Exclusion Tests for  GNP  and  Monetary  Variables25 
2  statistic, p—value  in parentheses 
GNP  Growth  M2  Growth  Funds Rate  Risk Spread  Mix  Growth 
Small Firms  11.31  12.24  12.31  5.22  14.23 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.26)  (0.01) 
Large Firms  6.22  6.12  17.58  14.18  235 
(0.18)  (0.19)  (0.00)  (0.01)  (0.67) 
Small-Large  13.12  13.37  11.24  3.62  13.93 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.46)  (0.01) 
The first column of Table 4 indicates that  GNP is a qualitatively more 
important predictor for small  firm behavior.  One rejects the hypothesis 
that  lags of  real  GNP  growth  do not explain  the sales growth of small firms. 
But one cannot reject it for large firms.  Figures  5  and 6 suggest that 
lagged  GNP  is also a quantitatively  more  important  predictor of small  firm 
behavior.  In  Figure  5,  all  of  the coefficients on  lagged  GNP  are higher for 
small  firms than large firms.  Figure  6 confirms  this pattern,  using  the 
difference in sales growth  as  the dependent  variable; the coefficients on 
lags  2 and  4  as well as  the sum are significantly positive.  We interpret 
these  results  as being  consistent with  the  idea that credit market 
imperfections  make  small  firms more  Sensitive to aggregate demand  and 
25The  regressions for the first two rows include four lags each of the real 
growth  of small firms, the real sales growth  of large firms,  real GNP 
growth, and  the  monetary  variable listed on  top of  the  column.  For the 
first column,  which  lists  GNP at the  top,  the funds rate  is the  monetary 
variable.  The  regressions for the  third  row  replace the two sales growth 
variables with the difference between  the sales growth  of small and large 
firms. 
22 technology shocks.26 
The  monetary variables  also differ in predictive  power for  small and 
large firms,  mainly  in ways consistent with our theory.  The  results for  M2 
are quite striking.  One overwhelmingly rejects the hypothesis  that all the 
coefficients on  lags  of M2  growth are equal to zero  for  small  firms. 
Conversely, M2  growth  does not appear to help explain  the growth  rates of 
large firms,  since  one  cannot reject the hypothesis that  these  coefficients 
are zero.  M2  is  also a quantitatively  more important  predictor of small 
firm  behavior; and  it  is important to recognize that this holds true after 
controlling  for  the  impact of  GNP,  inflation,  and possible  interactive 
effects between large and  small firms.  The  coefficient  patterns in Figures 
5  and  6  indicate a stronger positive relation for  small  firms with lagged 
movements  in  M2.  than  for  large firms. 
The  Federal  Funds rate is a significant predictor of both large and small 
firm  behavior, once again after  controlling for  GNP, inflation and 
interactive  effects between large  and  small  firms.  One  interesting 
difference  is that small  firms appear to react  quicker  to movements in  the 
Funds rate.  The  coefficient  patterns in both Figures  5  and  6  suggest  that 
small  firm  sales  growth  decline  one quarter after a rise  in the Funds rate, 
2lf one  uses  MZ growth  instead of  the Funds  Rate,  one cannot reject  the 
exclusion restriction on  GNF  for either  large  or small  firms,  however the 
coefficients on  GNP still  tend to be  larger,  with  the difference being 
statistically significant for two of the four  lags.  If  one  uses the risk 
spread  instead  of the  Funds rate,  GNP appears  to matter for large firms but 
not  small firms.  All the coefficients  on  GNP are negative  for  large firms 
however, and either significantly positive or close to zero  for  small  firms. 
Further,  the pattern on the  GNP coefficients  of small  firms relative to 
large firms is quite similar across  the different specifications,  with the 
coefficients on  the  1st,  2nd and 4th  lag  tending to be significantly 
greater for  small firms than  large  firms,  and  the third lag  being equal. 
23 everything  else  equal.27  The  decline  is both  in absolute terms and relative 
to the sales growth  of large firms,  It takes  large firms two  quarters to 
decline after a rise  in the Funds rate,  again everything else equal. 
Moreover, as we discuss shortly,  the predictive power of the Funds rate for 
large firms appears  to  be  proxying for  the predictive power  of the risk 
spread. 
The risk  spread produces a pattern nearly the opposite of M2.  It is a 
significant predictor for large firms but  not for  small firms.  At the same 
time,  though,  the coefficient patterns do  not look much different between 
large and small  firma.28  It is also  interesting that,  when both monetary 
variables are included, the risk  spread  eliminates the explanatory  power of 
the Funds Rate  for large firms but not for small  firms.25  Of  all the 
270ne  possible  explanation for  the quick decline  in small firm sales  in the 
wake of a rise in the Funds rate is that small firms may  have to sharply 
Contract the offering of trade credit finance their sales.  In periods  of 
tight money,  banks may be  willing to supply loans to finance inventories 
(since these  loans are collateralized  by  the inventories.)  They  may  be  less 
willing to finance  firms' offerings of trade credit  since the collateral 
value  of  these  kinds  of loans is  highly  Uncertain.  We  are currently pursuing 
evidence  on these possibility.  See  Ramey  (1991) for a discussion of the 
widespread use of trade credit  in business sales. 
28  Because  the Fed did not start targeting  the Funds rate until  the mid 
sixties,  we reran these regressions  using the  sample  period  1965:Q1-1990:Q3. 
This did not  change our results. 
We  also  considered dropping the last  ten years of the sample since 
Bernanke argues  that the rate spread is a less  effective explanatdr  in the 
SO's  than  earlier.  Not surprisingly,  this weakened the impact  of  monetary 
policy  across both small  and  large firms.  Although  M2  was  no  longer 
significant,  the p—value  was much higher for the difference in  growth  rates 
(0.15)  and for the growth  rate of small  firms (0.27)  than for the growth 
rate of large firms large firms (0.57).  The  Funds rate followed a similar 
pattern, with  p—values of  0.05,  0.11,  and  0.33  for  the small and large firms 
respectively.  Similarly, the p-values for  the risk  spread  were  0.6,  0.65 
and  0.58;  thus once  one  drops the 80's the spread  does not appear  to matter 
more for large firms. 
29Conversely,  when  included jointly,  both  the Funds rate and  M2  are 
24 monetary variables,  the behavior of large firms is most  closely tied to the 
risk  Spread. 
The  mix  variable  produces results quite similar  to the  impact of  M2.3° 
It is a much better predictor  for  small firms than for large firms.  The 
exclusion tests indicate a significance  level  of  less than  17.  for  small 
firms, as compared to better than  677.  for large firms,  It  is also  true that 
the first three coefficients  on the mix  are positive  for  small firms, as is 
the sum.  This is the pattern  one  would  expect,  given that a fall  in the mix 
reflects credit tightening.  Conversely, the coefficients  on the mix for 
large firms are not significantly  different from  zero  at lags  1,  2 and 4,  as 
is the sum.  Overall, the  mix  has  very  little independent explanatory power 
for  large firms. 
It  is worth considering  why  small firms have  a closer statistical 
relationship  with  M2  and  the mix,  but  large firms are  in closer sync with 
the risk spread.  Because  each of these monetary variables has a significant 
endogenous  component, any structural explanations  must proceed  with caution. 
It is interesting,  though, that M2 and the  mix  are closely tied  to movements 
in  bank  credit, the primary  source of external  finance  for  small  firms, 
while the spread is most directly a barometer  of conditions  in the 
commercial  paper market,  where large firms participate.  Part of the  story, 
therefore, may be  that  MZ and the mix better proxy credit conditions  for 
significant  predictors of small  firm  behavior.  Thus,  it  is probably safe to 
say that the Funds rate and  M2  are jointly informative  about small  firms, 
while it  is the risk  spread  that  is  informative about large firms. 
30The mix variable  we use is the growth rate  of  bank  loans minus the growth 
rate of commercial paper.  We  differ slightly with  Kashyap, Stein  and  Wilcox 
(1991)  because we are studying growth  rates rather than levels. 
25 small firms, while the spread  better captures conditions for large firms.3' 
We  will present some evidence shortly  indicating that the current recession 
appears  to conform to this pattern. 
We  now compare the quantitative  response of small and large firms to 
innovations in monetary policy and  GNP.  As  mentioned earlier, we use two 
different methods existing in the literature to identify  exogenous movements 
in monetary policy.  We first consider  a  VAR framework  with the Funds rate 
as the monetary  variable,  and treat as exogenous  the component of the 
innovation in the Funds rate that is uncorrelated  with the innovations of 
the other variables in the system,  following Bernanke and Blinder (1990). 
We  subsequently use  dummy  variables  to proxy periods of exogenous shifts to 
tight  money,  following  Romer  and  Romer  11990).  For parsimony, we present 
results for  systems  where the difference  between  small and large firm growth 
rates is the exclusive firm  variable.  Results for  the systems  in which 
small  and large firms enter independently do not  differ appreciably. 
Figure  7  plots  the impact  of  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in the 
Funds rate  on  the  difference  between small and large firm  growth  rates.32  It 
also plots the response  of GNP for  comparison purposes.  To  obtain the 
impulse response  functions,  we orthogonalized the  shocks  using the following 
31As  Hernanke  11990)  observes,  the predictive of the  spread  has declined in 
recent years,  and the spread failed  to  widen  significantly  prior to the 
current recession.  Many economists,  however,  associate  the current recession 
with a  credit  crunch on small  firms.  This observation and the fact the spread 
hasn't  widened is compatible with our  evidence,  which  suggest that small  firm 
behavior is not highly correlated with the spread. 
3Lrhe  standard error bands are computed using 1000 draws  from  the 
Normal-inverse  Wishart posterior distribution  of the coefficient  vector, 
26 ordering:  GNP,  inflation,  small  minus large  firms,  the Funds rate33  The 
Funds rate is placed  last  to  allow  for the possibility that the Federal 
Reserve may Set this variable  based  on contemporaneous information  about any 
of the other  variables.  Also  implicit in this formulation  is the assumption 
that it takes  at least  one period for  the Funds rate to affect the other 
variables.  The overall Structure  closely  parallels  Bernanke and Blinder 
(1990). 
Figure  '7  suggests  that a shock to the  Funds  rate has a greater 
cumulative impact  on  small  firms than  on  large.  When  gauged against the 
overall impact on  GNP, the effect appears nontrivial.  For  more  than  two 
years following a rise  in the  Funds  rate the expected gp between small  and 
large growth  is more negative than  the expected absolute  decline in  GNP 
growth.  It also  appears  that small firms react more quickly; nearly half the 
overall decline relative to large firms occurs in the first two  quarters. 
A  one  standard deviation  increase in  GNP growth  also  has a relatively 
greater impact  on  small firms, though the difference  with large firms is 
smaller  than  in the  case of the Funds rate  shock.  This difference  is also 
not  significantly  different from  zero due  in large part to noise in the 
contemporaneous relationship  with  CNP,  as  the width  of the standard error 
bands at period zero  indicate.  Indeed,  as  Table 4  and Figures  5  and  6  show, 
lagged GNP has  a significantly  stronger impact  on  small  firms.  This  is 
reflected  in Figure 8 by  the  fact  that,  after period zero,  the mean growth 
33The impulse response  functions  are  insensitive to the ordering the Funds 
rate third rather  than  fourth.  Also,  if the three macro variables 
are placed  first, the precise  ordering of  the three makes no  significant 
difference. 
27 in the difference  rises on net f  or four quarters and the standard error  bands 
do  not  widen appreciably.  Simultaneity between the manufacturing  sector and 
GNP could explain the absence  of a small firm effect in the contemporaneous 
correlation  (i.e., at period  Zero).  The weaker results for  GNP  in 
comparison with the Funds rate experiment may also suggest  that monetary 
policy is  an  important dimension of the differential behavior of small 
firms. 
To  check  the robustness of our results on  the  impact of a monetary 
shock, we repeat the experiment,  this time using the Rorner  dummies as the 
indicators  of the stance  of monetary  policy.  We  augment the Romer dates by 
including  the credit crunch  of 1966:Q2 as another episode during  which 
monetary policy shifted exogenously.  Kashyap,  Wilcox,  and Stein  (1990) 
discuss  evidence  from  a rereading  of the  FOMC minutes that  suggests this 
episode may fit the criteria  used by  the Romers.34 
We  follow Romer  and  Romer  by  including  three years of lags  (twelve 
since we use quarterly data) of the  dummy variables  in our  VAR system.  We 
estimate  two different models.  The  first includes GNP,  inflation,  the 
difference  between small  and  large firms,  and the Romer  dummies.  The  second 
adds the Funds rate to the system.  The purpose is to address the problem 
that  the  Romer  dummy  does not  measure the intensity  of the policy shift.  A 
crude way of capturing the overall degree of  monetary tightness is to 
include  a quantitative measure of the stance  of  monetary policy along with 
the qualitative  dummies. 
34Excluding  the credit  crunch  does  not  significantly alter the results. 
28 Figures  9  thorugh  12  plot  the response of the difference  between sales 
growth  of small  and  large firms to a  Romer  episode,  along with the 
coefficients on  the Romer  dummies.  The impact  of a  Romer  episode on  small 
firms relative to large is clearly  negative and  prolonged.  This is true 
whether or not  the Funds rate is  included.  All the Romer dummy coefficients 
are negative,  with five out of twelve being significantly  different from 
zero.  The impact  is substantial.35  For two and a half years following a 
Rorner shock small firms sales  drop more than four percent per year  faster 
than  large firm  sales.  This exceeds the absolute drop  in the  GNP growth 
rate.  Also,  for  most of the period, a two—standard  deviation error band for 
small minus large firm  sales  lies below zero. 
The overall sharp  decline  in small firms relative to large is 
in part  due  to the direct impact of the Funds rate and in part to the 
indirect, effect of the decline in  GNP.  Either channel is compatible with 
our theory.  Credit  market  imperfections induce a magnified  response of 
small  firms to aggregate  demand  and technology shocks,  as well as to 
monetary shocks.  As  we argue later, alternative theories do not  easily 
explain  our variety  of facts. 
To further explore the role  of  financial factors, we also  examine the 
behavior of bank lending for  each class of firms following tight money.36  We 
35me  Romer  shock is not exactly comparable to the Funds rate shock,  since  in 
the  latter  case,  the dynamics permit  the Funds rate to revert back to trend. 
Another possible difference  owes  to the  fact  that asymmetries  may be 
present,  since  the credit frictions are more likley to  bind  in  bad  times 
than in  good  times.  Since the  Romer  dates  include  only  tight money  periods, 
they may capture an  asymmetric response. 
The  QFR  provides balance  sheet data on  bank lending for the same 
29 add the real  growth  rates of bank lending to large and small  firms to the 
VAR system that  includes the Funds rate (but not the Romer  dummies).  Figure 
13 reports the cumulative response  of each of  these  variables to a one 
standard deviation rise  in the Funds rate.  Clearly, lending to small  firms 
declines,  while it rises for  large firms.  In  Figure 14  we perform a similar 
experiment,  this time using the ratio of the growth of bank loans to the 
growth of sales  for  each class of firms.  The  cumulative impact  on  this 
ratio for small  firms is never significantly different from  zero.  On  the 
other  hand,  this ratio for large firms rises sharply for the first year 
after  the Funds rate increase.  Both the results in Figures  13  and  14  are 
consistent  with the possibility  that monetary policy  has  a stronger direct 
impact  on  small firms; and,  relatedly,  that small firms are less  able than 
large firms to borrow to smooth the  impact of  declining sales. 
An  informal graphical  description of the sales  data provides further 
insight  into our results.  Figure  15  plots  the sales growth  of small  and 
large firms along with a smoothed version of these growth  rates.  The 
smoothed  data  is the product  of a non-parametric  filter designed to pick up 
broad movements.3'  In  particular, the filter  dampens  the impact  of  infrequent 
large movements  in the data.38  The  smoothed  data is thus able to 
characterize  the differential behavior between, large and small firm growth 
size categories  as sales.  We  adjusted for  level  changes due  to 
reclassification  using the same method we used  when  correcting  sales, 
37We  smoothed the data using  an  Splus program that  robustly  smooths a time 
series by  means of running medians. 
38me lines reflecting the smoothed data should not be  interpreted as low 
frequency trends.  In  contrast to the Hodrick-Prescott  filter, this  filter 
Hodrick..Prescott filter,  this filter  does not  decompose  the the  data into a 
trend  of lower frequency than the business cycle and a cyclical component. 
30 rates in sharp relief.  The pictures in Figure 15  are in harmony with our 
formal  regression results.  Small firms appear  to exhibit much steeper and 
larger declines around both recessions and  Rorner  episodes.  The  only 
exception is the 1974  Rorner date,  which coincided  with an oil shock.  Indeed 
it is interesting to note  that small  firms react more strongly  than  large 
firms, not  only  during major monetary contractions,  such as 1979,  but  also 
during  the more moderate contractions such as 1968  and  1978. 
Finally, it is interesting to extend the analysis to the current 
recession.  Figure  16  plots  the growth rates of small and  large firms from 
1988:Q1 through  1991:Ql.  A  smoothed  version of the data is presented  in the 
panel  below.39  For six of  the seven  quarters in the period leading into the 
recession,  1989:Q2 to  l990:Q4,  the growth  rate of  small firms is 
substantially below the growth rate of large firms.  There is some  evidence 
to suggest  that in the latter half of this period, 1990:02 to 1990:04,  the 
relative slow growth of small firms may  have  been  due  to a credit crunch, 
defined  as a disruption  of credit owing  to poor health of  the banking 
system.  This interpretation is based on  the  behavior of the financial 
aggregates  over this period,  as plotted in Figure 17. 
Gradual monetary tightening appears  to  have  occurred over the first 
half  of the overall  period, l988:Q1 to  l989:Q2.  This is reflected by  the 
steady  decline  in  M2  growth,  the steady rise in the Funds  rate,  the mild 
rise  in the risk-spread,  and  the decline in the  mix  variable.  This  monetary 
contraction  appears to produce a decline in both small and  large  firm  growth 
39me  smoothed  data is obtained from  applying the Splus program to the  entire 
sample  period  (1959:Ql  -  l991:Ql), and not only  the recent quarters. 
31 rates throughout  1989,  with the small firm growth  rate falling faster.  All 
the monetary aggregates  reverse  course  in 1989:Q3,  reflecting  a  beginning of 
monetary ease.  Symptoms  of a crunch  begin in  1990:Q1.  While the Funds rate 
and the risk—spread  continue downward, (possibly reflecting  continued 
monetary  ease),  M2  growth  begins  to decline and the mix  variable  falls 
sharply.  One  would  expect problems in banking to reduce  M2  growth  and 
growth  of the mix.  They  would  also  tend to place downward pressure on the 
spread, owing  to a decline  in the issuance  of  CDs.4°  The  credit crunch 
interpretation is buttressed by  the fact that f  or the three quarters 
subsequent to  1990:01,  small firms grow at a rate considerably below large 
firms. 
It is worth adding that the overall picture is consistent  with our 
general  finding that small firms have tended to  move positively  with both  M2 
and the mix (after  controlling for  GNP,  inflation,  and large firms),  while 
large firms have  tended to  move  inversely with the risk spread  (after 
controlling  for  ChIP,  inflation and small firms).  It is also  interesting to 
observe how well  small firm  behavior tracks the mix,  with a one period  lag. 
Indeed,  the one  quarter in the  interval  1989:02 
—  1990:04 where small firms 
grew faster  than  large firms was  preceeded by  rapid  growth  of  the mix.  This 
one  period lag also  appears in the formal  econometric work (see  Figures  5 
400ne  difference  of the current recession from the previous ones  is that the 
growth  rate of managed liabilities of financial intermediaries  (large CDs and 
Eurodollar  deposits)  declined in the period preceding the  downturn.  In  the 
past, managed liabilities  have grown sharply  as financial  institutions have 
tried to offset the effects of tight money.  Since CDs are close  substitutes 
for  commercial paper,  the contraction  in the supply of managed liabilities 
may be  part  of  the  explanation for why the risk  spread  did not  rise 
appreciably this time around.  See  Bernanke (1990)  for  a general  discussion. 
32 and  6.) 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
Macroeconomics has traditionally  focused on the behavior of  large 
firms.  In our view, small firms deserve attention as well.  Because they 
are  more likely to face credit market imperfections,  small  firms are 
particularly sensitive  to macroeconomic  disturbances,  including shifts  in 
monetary policy.  The  evidence  in this paper is supportive of this view.  We 
show,  using several  methodologies,  that monetary  policy  has a relatively 
larger impact  on  small firms.  Perhaps the most striking statistic is that 
for a period of two  years  and  a half following a  Romer  episode of tight 
money,  the average  annual growth rate of small manufacturing  firms is more 
than  four percentage  points below the average annual growth  rate of large 
manufacturing  firms. 
Our  coefficient  estimates  suggest that the differential response  of 
small firms to tight money  is  due  both  to the direct  impact of monetary 
policy  and to the- indirect  impact  working through the overall  decline  in 
economic  activity (small firms  are more sensitive  to  movements  in  GNP). 
Either channel is consistent  with our emphasis on  credit market 
imperfections,  since the  model  we developed  predicts that small  firms should 
be  excessively sensitive not  only  to to interest rates,  but  also to demand 
or technology shifts.  The  fact that bank loans to small firms decline 
following a rise  in the  Funds  rate,  while they  instead  rise for large firms, 
is further evidence compatible with our emphasis on  financial factors. 
Could  a frictionless  framework  explain our results?  One  possibility  is 
that small firms are concentrated in industries  that are both 
33 highly-interest  sensitive  and cyclical, implying that we are merely 
capturing  industry  effects.  The  data required to fully resolve this issue 
is currently  incomplete.  The  available  data,  however, suggests  that a 
simple industry  effects story is unlikely; it  indicates no particular 
pattern in the distribution  of small firms between cyclical versus 
non—cyclical manufacturing  industries.  A  second possibility  is that 
technological factors make small firms more volatile,  perhaps because  they 
are generally less  capital  intensive (e.g.  Mills  and Schumann (1985)).' 
However,  pure technological stories could easily  lead  to the opposite 
predictions.  One could argue,  for example, that large firms should have 
greater flexibility  in responding to  shocks  because they  are likely to have 
greater excess capacity.  And  being more capital  intensive also  should, 
everything else equal,  make  large firms more sensitive  to interest rate 
shifts.  Explaining the differential response of bank lending for  small  and 
large firms to Funds rate shocks also appears problematic  in a perfect 
markets  setting.  Nonetheless, we agree that discriminating  between these 
various  hypotheses is clearly  an item deserving of  further research. 
A  related objective,  which we are currently pursuing, is expanding the 
data  set  beyond  the manufacturing  Sector.  Because  the percentage  of  small 
firms in the manufacturing  sector is well below the percentage  for the 
economy  as a whole (see Gertler and  Hubbard  (1989)),  it is quite possible 
410ur  results cannot  be  explained  by  the fact that small firms are typically 
less  diversified.  This  kind  of story explains  why  small firms may have a lot 
of idiosyncratic  volatility,  but  is does not explain  systematic  volatility 
(i.e., co—movement with the cycle).  Nor, in the  absence of  informational 
frictions, can it explain a greater sensitivity  to monetary policy. 
34 that our analysis  has understated  the overall macroeconomic relevance  of 
small  firms. 
Finally worth noting are the results  that both  M2  and the mix  between 
commercial paper and bank loan financing contain  considerably more 
predictive  power for small  firms than for  large firms (while at the same 
time,  the commercial paper/ T-bill  spread is a better predictor f  or large 
firms).  Both  M2  and  the mix variable are financial  aggregates that are tied 
closely to the performance  of banking.  And  small firms have  traditionally 
been heavily dependent on  bank  financing.  These  kinds of financial/real 
regularities should not occur in a Miller/Modigliani  world.  Our results, 
therefore, are sympathetic  to theories emphasizing the behavior of banks 
(and, relatedly,  the behavior of small firms  and  other  "small" 
borrowers)  both  in the monetary transmission mechanism and  in the business 
cycle. 
35 Appendix: The Case  of Rationing 
The impact  of  a rise in the promised payment on the expected return to 
the firm's debt  is given by  (1  - p) - /28x Ithe denominator  in ap/8x -- see 
equation  (6)1.  In  the text we implicitly assumed that this value  is 
positive,  which guarantees  that the supply curve in Figure  1  is always 
upward sloping.  This hypothesis is quite reasonable under plausible 
outcomes for the bankruptcy probability  p  and for  the ratio  of the default 
cost to output.  It is conceivable that this condition is violated  for  very 
small  firms,  in particular, for firms where  G is quite small  relative to '. 
For  these kinds of firms,  the supply curve bends backwards.  The  optimum is 
accordingly the maximum  feasible value of  x.  Even  though these  firms are 
'rationed, however, shifts in e  and r still have  a magnified  impact.  In 
analogy to  Williamson  (1987),  the solution under  rationing is found as 
follows:  Conditional on  x,  the  choice  of p  which yields  the maximum 
expected  return to the intermediary is given by the condition that the net 
marginal  rise  in the intermediary's  expected payoff  equal  zero: 
(1  - p) - /2Ox = 0  (Al) 
This condition and equation (3),  which requires  that the intermediary  receive 
a competitive return, then  jointly  determine  x  and  p.  Further, by 
incorporating  (7),  (3) may be  simplified to 
2 
p  =  )1/2))r/&)x  (A2) 
Figure  4 illustrates the equilibrium for the rationing case.  The  supply 
curve bends backward before  it  intersects the demand curve.  The value of x  at 
which it bends backward is the optimum.  Equations  (Al) and  (A2)  define this 
36 value. 
Relative to the benchmark of perfect markets,  x is more responsive to 
shifts in  B  and r.  A  percentage rise in r induces more than a percentage 
decline in x.  (Recall that this elasticity  is  —  1  under perfect markets.) 
The  argument may be  seen  in two steps.  Because  in this case  raising the 
promised payment reduces the intermediary's  expected return, the rise in r 
requires  a fall in  x  to reduce the size of the  loan.  The fall in x,  however, 
increases the average ex post bankruptcy cost, '/8x, forcing  a further 
reduction in x,  in order to bring down the default  probability  p.  In terms of 
Figure 2,  the rise in r rotates the supply curve upward,  shifting the optimum 
inward.  For  analogous reasoning, a shift  in  e  also  has a magnified impact  on 
x. 
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